



Basarab Nicolescu defines transdisci-
plinarity as follows: “Transdisciplinarity 
concerns that which is at once between the 
disciplines, across the different disciplines, 
and beyond all disciplines. Its goal is the 
understanding of the present world, of 
which one of the imperatives is the unity 
of knowledge.” See: Basarab Nicolescu, 
‘Methodology of Transdisciplinarity — Levels 
of reality, Logic of the included middle and 
Complexity’ in: Transdisciplinary Journal of 
Engineering & Science Vol. 1, No. 1, (2010), 
pp. 19-38.
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Intra-lingual translation would refer 
to translations that take place within a 
language, where we are looking at synonyms 
or similar words equivalent to each other. 
Inter-lingual translations would refer to 
method of meaning transference between 
two languages, where often many transfor-
mations occur in meaning and expression. 
The third, inter-semiotic translations occur 
between verbal and non-verbal systems of 
communication where translations could 
occur between word, image, performance, 
sound, and other media. This third type 
of translation is most relevant when we 
consider contemporary art discourse. See: 
Roman Jakobson, ‘On Linguistic Aspects 
of Translation’, in: R. A. Brower (ed.), On 
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University Press, 1959, pp. 232-239. 
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applications in philosophy of science and aesthetics. Jakobson maintains 
that linguistics when understood as a “global science of verbal structure” 
encompasses poetics as an integral part of it.5 Nuancing the distinction 
between linguistics at large and poetics in particular, makes it possible for us 
to free translation from the domain of words strictly and engage with it on 
philosophically speculative terms. When we consider ‘metaphysics’ as a tool 
to speculate on translation, then the first step is to understand the nature 
of translation as a transforming process and the second is to see how appar-
ently different disciplines are capable of appropriating 
or mobilizing translation as their own method, be it 
science, mathematics, or art, thereby making translation 
a key method of any transdisciplinary practice.6 This 
paper seeks to understand the role that translation plays 
beyond its linguistic enterprise. It reflects on the task of 
living with unintelligible, opaque, and subjective points 
of view, and speculates on the intention of translation 
with the aim of situating it as a foundational method in 
acts of transdisciplinary creation.
THE RETURN OF THE TRANSLATOR
From the edge of meaning to the edge of sense
Srajana Kaikini
Poet, linguist, translator A.K. Ramanujan’s poem Elements of Composition 
begins with the following line: “Composed as I am, like others, of elements on 
certain well-known lists [...].”1 The phrase reflects a linguist’s comment on his 
own relational existence in the world, a translated self, attributing its compo-
sition to a list of innumerable things. In a critical portraiture of Ramanujan, a 
deft translator who emerged as one of the leading modern Indian theorists on 
translation, scholar Vinay Dharwadkar calls the poet a postcolonial cosmo-
politan. He describes how theory, for Ramanujan, is not, by definition:
autonomous or self-reflexive. It is and has to be a 
transitive or instrumental enterprise undertaken in 
relation to a past, present or conceivable future practice 
that simultaneously gives rise to it and is informed and 
transformed by it, but which it cannot entirely describe, 
predict, or contain.2
Any attempt to theorize the act of translation traverses 
this thin line of having to remain relevant to practice as 
well as having a transformative impact on knowledge. 
The exercise of translation thus is a complex combina-
tion of moves which must be reworked in tune with the 
questions thrown at us from our contemporary worlds. 
First, the most obvious questions must be asked, and 
then the not so obvious will eventually surface. 
When does translation come into play? The 
most common situation in which we need the help 
of translation is with the remark ‘I don’t understand 
this’ — a feeling of not being able to relate to a situation, 
an object, or speech. When we speak of translation, 
the question that follows automatically is, what is this 
a translation ‘of ’? The usual suspect in most cases is 
‘language’ — translating the meaning of one word in a 
language into another language trying to preserve an 
equivalence of meaning. The linguist and literary theo-
rist Roman Jakobson identifies three major typologies of 
translation — translation could be intra-lingual, inter-lin-
gual, and inter-semiotic.3 Defining the domain of poetics 
as part of linguistics, he asks a seminal question, “What 
makes a verbal message a work of art?”4
This question lends itself to many tangential 
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on metaphors. Metonymy — the expression 
of something through an aspect of that 
thing, which has the potential to represent 
the full concept — can be argued as a way 
of mathematizing experience in order to 
enrich its creative expressive possibilities. 
See: Roman Jakobson, ‘The metaphoric 
and metonymic poles’, in: David Lodge 
(ed.), Modern Criticism and Theory. A 
Reader, New York: Longman Inc., 1988, p. 
57. This extract is taken from: ‘Two Aspects 
of Language and Two Types of Aphasic 
Disturbances’, in: Jakobson and Morris 
Halle (eds), Fundamentals of Language, 
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The addressor sends the message via 
speech to the addressee. To be functional 
this transaction needs a context of refer-
ence, a ‘code’ (any kind of language) for the 
message and a contact that enables the 
communication. It may help to note here 
the emphasis put on a systematic structure 
for language by Ferdinand de Saussure, in a 
situation where the connection between the 
signifier and the signified is rather arbitrary. 
See: Saussure, ‘The object of study’, ‘Nature 
of the linguistic sign’, in: Lodge (ibid.), pp. 
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perception almost always means perception in the mixed mode of symbolic 
reference”.10 For such a mode of perception based on reference, a ‘common 
ground’ is required and this perception, he says, in turn is subject to possible 
errors. This ‘common ground’ shared between two nodes of transaction thus 
requires that there are certain points or loci available 
for connections (the authenticity or correctness of 
it is another debate).11 These nodes of transaction in 
turn have crucial political import. Emphasis on one or 
another node reflects an urgency of the discourse to 
address the condition of its time. So we have had histor-
ical turns where the author, the artist, the spectator, and 
more recently, the mediator, emerge as the node that 
asks for special consideration.
Historically speaking, most of critical 
literary theory marked its discourse around the 
Addressor – Speech – Addressee model.12 This model 
underwent substantial reconfiguration with the coming 
of the ‘Age of Reading’ and the turn towards reader-re-
sponse criticism in the 1960s and 1970s coinciding with 
Derridean deconstruction in the West.13 Deconstruction 
critiqued subordination by text and called for a reor-
dering of the approach to a text by opening it up as a 
predominantly re-structureable system of signs. This 
means that the ‘text’ is no longer available for mere 
interpretation but for a complete questioning and 
analysis of its signifying structure. Such a reading 
always aims at a relationship which is not perceived by 
the writer, between what the text commands and the 
language he uses. This is synchronous with the concept 
of the ‘death of the author’ observed by Roland Barthes 
and more presently the call for the ‘emancipated spec-
tator’ by Jacques Rancière.14 In her book The Return of 
the Reader: Reader-Response Criticism, literary critic 
Elizabeth Freund discerns the general tendency in 
conventional modern criticism (in this case Western 
tradition) to adopt unaffected, clinical and distant 
technical language in an attempt to follow ‘scientific 
hermeneutics’ to keep ‘unruly language’ within limits 
of legibility. ‘Reader-response criticism’ focuses on the 
experience of the audience, rather than on the author, or 
on a work’s content, form, or historical context.15 Thus, 
similar to how literary theory heralds the ‘return of 
the reader’ as a turn towards a new fold of critical tools 
to examine the subjective experience, so too, does the 
‘return of the translator’ emerge from a demand of our 
times for theoretical tools to negotiate our experience 
In the context of scientific discourses, philosopher Sundar Sarukkai who has 
written widely at the interstices of science, language, and translation observes 
that the foundations of science are intrinsically connected to methods of 
translation. Scientific discourse is an attempt at writing the “text of the 
‘original’ world” and the very notion of ‘translation’ presupposes the concept 
of an ‘original’.7 This condition also presupposes a translatability of the ‘orig-
inal’. If science attempts to understand the phenomena of the world, this 
understanding is communicable only when the world re-emerges through the 
scientist’s instruments — either through statistics, or formulae, or diagrams, 
or images (fig. 1). Thus, it can be argued that the world is presented after under-
going a treatment of translation.
When it comes to aesthetic experience, we are in the domain of 
semiotics, and consequently of inter-semiotic translations. Be it attuned to 
literature, music, art, or even science, an experience which can be aesthet-
ically considered implies a negotiation not just of knowledge, but also of 
affect. Inter-semiotic translations operate in between sign systems — be it of 
the verbal or the non-verbal kind. At the core of the inter-semiotic domain 
vocabulary, familiarity and consistency become precarious in relation to the 
act of translation. Art as a distinct semiotic domain must be encountered 
via methods of access, approach, and negotiation that actively transform the 
art experience into a communicable expression. Even when we term certain 
experiences, be they aesthetic or mundane, as inexpressible or untranslatable, 
their nature is ultimately captured by a construct of language which refers 
to ‘that’ which is inexpressible. Yet again, we find ourselves in the arena of 
symbols and signs and their power to make or unmake meaning.8
Playing with Symbols
Sarukkai maintains that translation in fact gives us 
insight into the structure of the concepts of different 
languages — translation tests the ‘meaning-bearing’ 
capacity in between languages, thereby enabling our 
understanding of the ‘boundaries of concepts’ in 
different languages.9 When one encounters an ‘alien 
language’ — the inherent translator within us moves us 
to ‘make sense’ of this alien language in terms that are 
commensurable. Thus, even if attributed to wrongly, 
once meaning attaches to the concept in one ‘language’, 
it allows a free transformation of the concept in the 
‘new language’, thereby exhibiting its potential to accrue 
meaning and enable different experiences of it. 
As mathematician and process philosopher Alfred 
North Whitehead observes in his thesis on metaphysics 
Process and Reality, ‘symbolic reference’ is a primary 
mode of human perception. He states, “symbolic refer-
ence belongs to one of the later originative phases of 
experience […]. When human experience is in question, 
19
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20
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1986.
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of symbolization. Suppose you assign a fixed symbol to an otherwise contin-
gent concept, say for instance, A = a bag of five apples and B = a bag of six 
oranges. The immediate understanding of this equation is sensing a fixation 
of meaning. A and B appear more fixed as compared to a bag of apples or 
oranges, which is vulnerable to forces from the world. However, resisting this 
reading of mathematics as a mode of universal semantic singularity, Sarukkai 
argues for the naturalizing of the mathematical vocabulary, demonstrating 
that mathematics in fact can be seen as primarily a playful mode of translating 
the world:19
But mathematics is writing. The activity by which mathematics creates its 
alphabets highlights its first engagement with NL [natural language]: it reduces 
the graphic width of words into graphemes. This move is a writing of writing. 
It is rewriting the already written. It is the activity of translation which best 
describes this ‘writing of writing’.20
By arguing against the conventional notion that mathematics constantly tries 
to negate its connections with natural language by arguing that mathematics 
itself is an act of translation of the world, Sarukkai moves the target of trans-
lation from meaning towards marking. Translation, he argues, is more akin to 
tracing than one-to-one mapping even in the mathematical domain and the 
discipline of mathematics must first acknowledge its own contingency on the 
world of natural language. 
By this repositioning of mathematics as a mode of translation, Sarukkai 
implicitly also undermines the exclusive nature of the discipline of math-
ematics and moves it into an interstitially available domain. The power 
structure of the discipline is dismantled. By positing process before the 
object, mathematization as a process is brought closer to the subjective 
process of ‘making sense’ or ‘translating’. By writing words as symbols, alpha-
bets, numbers, ‘opaque entities’, play is made possible. A ludic loosening of 
grammar, where a possibility of a new structure emerges from an apparently 
fixed way of doing things, play is the mode within which realities, temporali-
ties, and truths can be questioned. The so-called symbolic reductions become 
sites of ‘differential plurality’, i.e. velocities as words cannot be composited 
but velocities as vectors ‘v’ can be; mass as a word cannot be added but mass 
as ‘m’ can be.21 This resonates with the way metonymy operates in the crea-
tion of idioms, where poetry is made possible in an otherwise prosaic expres-
sion through the use of condensed symbolization. 
Just as science invents its own instruments to 
operate, every field of enquiry makes its own tools. 
Whitehead, with the claim that “the tool of philosophy 
is language”22 talks about this inevitable dialectical 
dependence of experience on language as a limit condi-
tion — a contradictory condition wherein language 
breaks down in its attempt to express:
of the ‘contemporary’ — a contemporary that is warped with information at 
speeds and intensities that threaten to erase the spaces of active reception, 
and replace them with passive consumption (fig. 2). 
Once we understand that translation thrives on speculation, the possibilities 
of speculation over an experience clearly present us with a problem — that of 
a completely subjective interpretation of the thing translated. What do we do 
with such an expanded sense of subjectivity, this anxiety about shareability of 
experiences? What do we do about our intuitive faith in an objectivity that is 
promised by science? How do we acquire the stamina to 
embrace this proliferation of viewpoints?
Here, a small detour into the question of ‘objec-
tivity’ and its socio-cultural history would help. 
Objectivity — ‘the view from nowhere’16 — gained 
maximum currency in the age of ‘modern science’ with 
the emergence of Newtonian physics.17 The geometric 
and the diagrammatic mode of understanding complex 
phenomena has been the ultimate goal of most philos-
ophers from the Western tradition: those who adhere 
to scientific understandings of the world including 
Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Reichenbach, Hobbes et al.18 It 
has also been seen as a move towards ‘truth’, the heart 
of the matter, the real representation of reality through 
formulae and numbers, such that all possibility of 
alterity, multiplicity, instability is stripped away from 
this mode of representing the world. The contingency of 
thought is therefore seemingly given certain parameters 
for determinance, made more regulated, lawful, and 
thereby more flattened. At first glance this implies that 
semantic plurality gets curbed through these processes 
26
“[...] the page is a touching (of my hand 
while it writes and your hands while they 
hold the book). This touch is infinitely 
indirect, deferred [...] but it continues 
as a slight, resistant, fine texture, the 
infinitesimal dust of a contact, everywhere 
interrupted and pursued. In the end, here 
and now, your own gaze touches the same 
traces of characters as mine, and you read 
me, and I write you. [...] (If I write I create 
sense-effects [...] I displace myself from 
bodies. Exscription passes through writing 
[...] And so we have to write from a place, 
a body that we neither have nor are [...]” 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, Paris: Editions 
Métailié, 1992, trans. by Richard A. Rand 
as: Corpus, New York: Fordham University 




“[..] an intention, however, which no single 
language can attain by itself but which is 
realized only by the totality of their inten-
tions supplementing each other.” Walter 
Benjamin, cited in Sarukkai, op. cit. (note 
19), p. 670. Benjamin’s ideas on the ‘task of 
the translator’ reflect his pre-occupation 
with the act of translation as a transforma-
tive creative endeavour, where translation is 
a form in itself, with the aim to address first 
and foremost the relationship that languages 
have between each other. The task of 
translating, according to him, is to render 
transparent the interplay of syntax between 
pure languages, thereby allowing for the 
gaps between words to speak more that the 
wholeness of sentence structures which 
pose as an obstruction in Benjamin’s view, 
for “if the sentence is the wall before the 
language of the original, literalness is the 
arcade.” See: Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task 
of the Translator’, in: Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings (eds), Walter Benjamin. 
Selected Writings Volume 1, 1913-1926, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2002. 
25
This persistent effort to see is comparable 
to the opening passages in Thomas the 
Obscure, one of the important post-struc-
turalist novels by French philosopher and 
literary theorist Maurice Blanchot. His 
works influenced future post-structuralists 
such as Jacques Derrida. The protagonist in 
the novel negotiates situations that chal-
lenge his immediate perceptive experiences 
collapsing the divide between event and 
narration — a process that often underlines 
the translator’s act. One such excerpt is as 
follows: “Soon the night seemed gloomier 
and more terrible than any night, as if it 
had in fact issued from a wound of thought 
which had ceased to think, of thought taken 
ironically as object by something other than 
thought. It was night itself. Images which 
constituted its darkness inundated him. He 
saw nothing, and, far from being distressed, 
he made this absence of vision the culmi-
nation of his sight. Useless for seeing, his 
eye took on extra-ordinary proportions, 
developed beyond measure, and, stretching 
out on the horizon, let the night penetrate 
its center in order to receive the day from 
it. And so, thought hits void, it was sight and 
the object of sight which mingled together.” 
Maurice Blanchot, Thomas the Obscure, 
trans. Richard Lamberton, New York: 
Station Hill Press, 1988, p. 14. 
fig. 3  Srajana 
Kaikini, The 
languages I don’t 
understand — My 
grandfather’s 
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at FICA, New Delhi, 
India. 2014. (Photos: 
Srajana Kaikini)  
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from a boundary condition where the communication must take place across 
the boundary into unfamiliar terrain, could be an act of artistic creation. To 
express the unknown, the unsayable, the impossible involves shifting meaning 
and experimenting with them — symbols being tropes of such experiments. 
This is the mode underlining translation. Thus, translation inhabits all loci 
in the environment of a metaphysical entity — the phenomenon or the thing 
experienced, the receiver of an experience as well as the giver of an expe-
rience. Is translation then synonymous to the act of artistic creation? This 
is a question that will receive a wide range of answers. Perhaps a gardener 
would say — the seeds translate themselves into saplings but the gardener 
only makes it possible for their ‘translation’ to occur. Perhaps the Kantian 
would say — every expression translates a universal idea and so it could be 
dispensable. Perhaps the Naiyayikas (the Atomists) or the Nominalists would 
say — yes the word and the world are symbiotic and indispensable and hence 
translation too. Perhaps the Buddhists or the Cognitivists might say — trans-
lation is a tool without which cognition may not even 
be possible and therefore any act of creation is contin-
gent on it. Regardless of the all speculative positions 
of answering the question, what matters here is that 
this is the very modality through which translation as a 
method can work — as a fractal, as a rhizome, as a live 
multiplying cell.
Art as an experience is rendered translatable at 
the boundaries of itself — when it seeks to speak to an 
outside of it, be it mathematics, science, sociology, or 
technology. When a work of art presents itself to its 
spectator as an alien language (and therefore an alien 
phenomenon defining an experience for which the 
But the language of literature breaks down precisely at the task of expressing in 
explicit form the larger generalities — the very generalities which metaphysics 
seeks to express.23
He systematically rejects the possibility of self-sustained 
facts, floating non-entities and proposes merely a situ-
ation of breakdown — where natural language fails to 
grasp the thing that philosophy seeks to understand. 
However, the logical implication of this line — that 
mathematics can be the philosophers’ language — is the 
very jump that Sarukkai in his understanding of math-
ematization as an embodied naturalised process seeks 
to reject. He proposes, instead, a kinship between the 
mathematical and the natural language; a kinship which 
according to Walter Benjamin, is not concerned with 
similarity but with supplementary intentions underlying 
each language as a whole.24
The symbol is a trope of translating the alien 
tongue — like the groping in the dark of a person 
deprived of seeing in a lightless cave.25 She wants to see 
but cannot, hence she deploys her hands. She touches 
and sees through this touching. The symbol is the first 
touch that our cognition makes with the world. It is not 
a reductive constricting mechanism but an enabling, 
freeing trope. The cave translates itself into her experi-
ence through her touching. When asked to express this 
experience, she re-translates experience traced by her 
cognition into a new vision of her experience via words, 
materials, sound, lines, or movement. An artist is born 
through this process of translation. The creative act thus 
unfolds through this method of the tracer, the inscriber 
of the world into her system of knowing to be shared 
with her kin. Philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy expresses a 
similar ‘exscribing’ that takes place in the act of reading 
where the written word and the read word exist on the 
boundary of touch, the touch of hand translates to the 
touch of sight (fig. 3).26
Through Boundaries
Now, this proposition may seem sweeping — that every 
uttered expression is an act of artistic creation. Indeed, 
by present-day definition, it can be. We may say that 
the practice of questioning is indeed artistic; a thing 
born out of no-thing. But, to nuance the proposition 
that informs modes of being in the world, every act of 
expression that translates an experience or enables one 
28
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West, Vol. 27, no. 4, 1977, pp. 391-399.
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K. Krishnamoorthy, Poona: Oriental Book 
Agency, 1955, p. 37. For the annotated 
translation of the work by commentor 
Abhinavagupta, see: Anandavardhana 
and Abhinavagupta, The Dhvanyaloka 
of Anandavardhana with the Locana of 
Abhinavagupta, trans. by Daniel H.H. 
Ingalls, Jeffrey Mousssaieff Masson, M.V. 
Patwardhan, (ed.) Daniel H.H. Ingalls, 
Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
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Much has been written in the discourse 
of curating on the parallels between the 
curator and the translator, taking from 
Walter Benjamin’s 1923 text ‘The Task of 
the Translator’. When we see the curatorial 
through ideas of method, montage, perfor-
mance, the curator is most often heralded 
as the mediator, often the translator. On 
face, it appears to be a negotiation of 
networks. But what does it imply? See 
for example: Boris Buden, ‘Toward the 
Heterosphere: Curator as Translator’, in: 
Maria Lind (ed.), Performing the Curatorial: 
Within and Beyond Art, Berlin: Sternberg 
Press, 2012.
fig. 4  Srajana Kaikini, The ‘ambiguous’ process of curating. 2013. Brainstorming session of De Appel Curatorial 
Programme at de Appel Arts Centre, Amsterdam. (Photo: Srajana Kaikini)
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but having the momentum to make possible a motion of thought, ideas, 
works, and experiences (fig. 4). The curatorial gesture as a translational gesture is 
thus one of an ‘ambiguous’ tuning of senses, where “meanings of concepts are 
actually created through engaging with the alien in ambiguous ways”.28
Knowing-Seeing: Meaning as Experience 
This ‘ambiguous’ reflexivity in turn implies that translation is no longer in the 
stronghold of epistemology but exists interstitially. If translation’s inter-se-
miotic trapeze is to enable artistic creation, then there must be a new frame 
of understanding what this interstice is. What do we make of ‘I don’t under-
stand this’? Does this expression convey a lack of understanding at all? Or is 
it merely an expression that implies a lack of an expected understanding i.e. an 
understanding that does supposed justice to the original intended experience 
or meaning? Here, meaning and experience occur in the same register. They 
do not exist as epistemologically and ontologically distinct entities but are 
proposed as one cohesive mechanism — where cognition goes hand in hand 
with experience — a structural presupposition that can be seen in many South 
Asian philosophical schools.29 Two concepts — one from Sanskrit literary 
criticism and another from the Buddhist tradition that speak of such a cogni-
tive appropriation of our experience of the world will 
help demonstrate this entanglement between knowledge 
and experience. 
The Dhvani theorists speak about poetic expression 
through the mode of suggestion, where in all meaning 
is implicit within symbolism or concealed euphemism 
or merely hinted by means of experienced objects of the 
world. In other words, they reject the possibility of any 
‘object-less’ emotion.30 “The [element of suggestion is] 
twofold: ‘that which is based on the power of the word,’ 
and ‘that which is based on the power of the sense’.”31
This two-fold mode of expression through word 
and sense illustrates the synergy of the physical and 
metaphysical realm, where making meaning through a 
word is not complete without making meaning through 
sense. Word implies meaning while sense implies an 
experience. Thus the theory upholds expression of 
implicit sense with the usage of explicit objects. Any 
aesthetic experience is best expressed in the Dhvani 
view through the concrete descriptions of clear enti-
ties. The theory of suggestion thus falls in line with 
the Suprematists, the Russian Symbolists and later the 
Concrete Poets (fig. 5 & 6) who push symbolism to its limits 
by claiming to strip the word of all meaning and mani-
fest in their works, pure affect, feeling, emotion, play.32 
However, in their attempt to deconstruct the linguistic 
dominance on art, they in fact re-enforce an experience 
spectator has no vocabulary to respond with), the spectator as a historical 
subject stands at this boundary that distinguishes our experienced selves and 
the experience at hand and translates what we experience into an assemblage 
of the known, unknown, old, new, distant, near, intuitive, and reasoned. 
This act of translation as ‘making sense’ gives us a version of the work that 
we appropriate as our artistic experience. Whether this experience is as 
intended or new or random or considered false or irrelevant are secondary 
concerns; what is crucial here is that it is defined by the transference of 
meaning or affect. The relation is that of being ‘ambiguously’ reflexive. A 
relation therefore is manifested within a system where more than one entity 
demands a certain communication from the other entities to define its own 
nature. Translation, therefore, can be argued to be a 
foundational method in contemporary transdisciplinary 
creation where boundary conditions are constantly 
questioned and re-formulated.
When we consider the curatorial gesture as an 
inherently translational gesture, it is not to be reduced 
to one of being a connector of corresponding truths 
between the artist, the art work, and the audience.27 
Instead, the curatorial asks to be creatively understood 
as a gesture that charts a resonant frequency-overlap 
between the three fields in ambiguous ways, nebulous 
33
Ezra Pound, ABC of Reading, London: Faber 
and Faber, 1991 (third edition).
34
In Buddhist texts, the concept of dependent 
origination is expressed as follows: “When 
this is, that comes to be; on the arising of 
this, that arises. When this is not, that is not; 
on the cessation of that, this ceases.” See: 
‘Majjhima Nikaya’, trans. by Lord Charmers, 
in: Further Dialogues of the Buddha Vol. 5 
& 6, London: Oxford University Press, 1927, 
cited in: Bina Gupta, Reason and Experience 
in Buddhist Philosophy, New Delhi: Indian 
Council of Philosophical Research, 2009, pp. 
50-53. Of the schools of Indian philosophies, 
there is a prima facie understanding of the 
Buddhists as being the most ‘anti-rational’. 
However, as Gupta elaborates in her book, 
this ‘reason’ that is thought to be absent 
in the Buddhist philosophies alludes to 
the faculty of thinking through concepts. 
Buddhist philosophies mostly critique the 
value given to conceptual thinking and 
re-enforce the importance of ‘non-concep-
tual experience’. Therefore cognition plays 
an important role in the way the world is 
assimilated into knowledge and experience 
simultaneously. Ibid., p. 29.
fig. 5 & 6  Eugen Gomringer, Silence, 1953. Taken from: Eugen Gomringer and Jerome Rothenberg (eds), The Book of Hours, 
and Constellations: Being poems of Eugen Gomringer, New York: Something Else Press, 1968.  
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of the works. The work comes to us both as meaning and sensation. 
From playing with words to structures of space, these poets break 
language down into affect while allowing for a symbiotic experience of these 
works. This enchantment with precise and sharp economy of words was 
famously put forth by poet Ezra Pound who, in his fascination with Chinese 
ideograms, appropriated their linguistic structures to create his own ideas for 
what he termed as Imagist poetry — where word, image, meaning, experience 
all emerge simultaneously entangled with each other.33 Resonance — the 
mode with which the import of a poetic expression is received — thus again 
embodies a mode of translatory activity where in the resonant subjects in 
congruence with each other make meaning or construct an experience. This 
mode of resonance mimics the transaction that is promised by translation, 
a movement without which experience would fail. The word which is made 
radically opaque is appropriated by our cognition into an assemblage of sense 
and meaning. This way the reader has complete agency over the text she 
reads, and the viewer has complete agency over the art she perceives. The 
freedom to misread, unread, and non-read emerges and the phrase ‘I don’t 
understand this’ loses ground as understanding is subsumed by experience. The 
loosening of foothold in meaning marks a return of the translator who instead 
of being a mere preserver of inter-semiotic meaning becomes an enabler of 
uncharted experiences of the given and the seen.
The second theory which demonstrates the cognitive appropriation 
of experience is the Buddhist principle of Pratītyasamutpāda or ‘dependent 
origination’ whose basic import could be understood as ‘When this is, that 
comes to be’. This theory is a doctrine of causality where intuition functions 
as an ‘operative concept’ and the truth of a thing is apprehended through 
perception. But this perception is more than mere sight. 
Instead it is a mode of a ‘knowing-seeing’.34 This view 
does not pre-suppose empirical experience but makes 
possible speculative, propositional, and imaginative 
experiences that can dwell under statements that 
could begin with ‘what if ’ or ‘suppose’ and operate 
both through the domains of the known and the felt. 
The reason for invoking these two theories is two-fold. 
Firstly, they illustrate an uneasy and hazy blurring of 
epistemology and ontology by invoking the cognitive 
and temporal nature of experiences thereby presenting 
to us the curious positioning of translation in this 
blurred zone. Secondly, they frame the politicized nature 
of translation. An event of translation is a contingent 
just like the expression ‘I don’t understand this’, which 
ironically communicates a failure to relate. Its event is 
inevitably chosen and expressed in specific structure, 
ambition and for certain effect. Translation intends to 
constantly speak from the boundaries, pushing against 
comfortable categories and trying to invoke a new 
35
Gangadhar Chittal, ‘DukkhaGeete’, 
in: Shantinath Desai (ed.), Gangadhar 
Chittalara Kavya Srishti, Bangalore: Prism 
Book House, 2002, p. 97. Translation by 
author. 
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creatively co-opt translation as a political and structural tool in the domain of 
experience vis-à-vis meaning. With the sensorial turn gripping the field of the 
curatorial and artistic research, in a time where politics of hurt, care, feeling, 
and dissent are on the table, translation seeks an intentional re-definition in 
the transdisciplinary structure of our negotiations with the world. 
Translation thus emerges as an active relation that one enters into when 
expressing linguistically, creatively, or emotively. Yes, an artist translates, a 
curator translates, a spectator translates, a mother translates, a geographer 
translates, a storyteller translates, the moment we attempt to voice an inten-
tion that must be conveyed, we enter the domain of translation. If translation 
enables possibilities of new unarticulated meanings it can only be inferred 
then that the intention to translate is not to preserve but to make free a 
thought. This making free is not a violation of the ‘original’ but a desire that 
comes from a feeling of care for that which is translated. This cared thought 
is translated to be freely appropriated and renewed by the world. Thus the 
proliferation of experience is perhaps the only justificatory mode which 
makes translation possible as a method for making as well as experiencing. 
What is supposedly then ‘lost’ in translation is ‘gained’ through speculation. 
Thus, we could tackle the utterance ‘I don’t understand this’ by first 
trying to understand why we want to understand, and what the ‘this’ that 
we are trying to grasp is, and then ask what makes us feel obliged to be part 
of this relational structure in the first place. The method of translation as 
‘making sense’ and consequently ‘making heard or seen’ offers us a ‘relation-
ship’ strategy to negotiate the contemporary conundrum by appropriating 
what we discern as our artistic experience. By recognizing and charting out 
the contingent forces that drive us to ask certain questions and drive us to 
want to express certain ideas, translation as a mode emerges as the trapeze 
that can make the artist swing from the edge of meaning to the edge of sense, 
creating as many gaps as the leaps she is willing to take. 
I am grateful to Dr. Sundar Sarukkai, H.M.Tapasvi, Jayant Kaikini, Smita 
Kaikini, and the editors at Kunstlicht for their keen comments and reflections on 
the paper and the timely technological support from Dr. Meera Baindur.
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structure of the world by deciding to inhabit an interstitial space. It is dissat-
isfaction with the status quo, a desire to make new of what has always been 
and an experimental state of mind. 
The struggle of the human psyche with making sense of the world 
she inhabits is expressively reflected in the closing lines from a poem 
Dukkhageete (Song of Sadness) by Indian poet Gangadhar Chittal (who wrote 
in Kannada) to a person ravaged by anguish, raving with existential ques-
tions. The poet writes:
Eke idu, enu idu, entu idu enabedā, 
Don’t say, why so? What and how be this? 
chīridarū brahmānḍa birivante 
even if you scream such that the universe tears open
bānataḷa chippoḍedu siḍivante kūgidaru, 
even if the heaven and earth crumble under the thunder of your wailing 
horaḷidaru, dikku dikkugaḷa kadakada baḍedu naraḷidaru, 
even if you roll on the floor, moan, beat frantically on the doors of 
all directions,
ahā niruttarā, niruttarā, niruttarā sṛśṭi.
Answer-less, Answer-less, Answer-less, oh nature.35
Nature is niruttara — answer-less, to the suffering poet’s relentless questioning 
to his world. His anguish only to be responded through a three-fold echo, as 
if reflecting from the landscape — a double-edged response from mute nature. 
‘Niruttara, niruttara, niruttara’. This ‘nature’ that is outside of the boundaries 
of the self, perhaps will never answer. We provide our own answers, and in 
the garb of degrees of concreteness or fluidity, we become authors of various 
modes of translating our emotions, churnings — translating our worlds and 
becoming translations of our worlds.
The Intention of Translation
We return to the questions we began with. How can we affirm the act of 
translation as a vital force of proliferation rather than a mode of flattening 
and silencing the rough edges of our world? How do we negotiate our 
precarious subjectivities? How do we exercise translation at all without 
universalizing or relativizing absolutely? The first step in trying to reckon 
with these questions is to recognize how translation performs as a method 
which is actively contingent with our everyday interaction with the world. 
Language and the world are in strange relationship with each other; in math-
ematics and science, as well as in philosophy. The role that language plays 
in the discipline of philosophy embodies an inherent dichotomy — it tries to 
relate the observed specific world to a generic understanding of it. We can 
see how translation plays a role in this relation. Theories 
like Dhvani resonance or ‘dependent origination’ of 
Buddhist metaphysics or of embodied cognition in 
mathematical philosophy give us handles into trying to 
Antoinette Nausikaä, I Touch Things So I Can Feel Them, 2011, drawing. Courtesy the artist.
